is research paper examines how e ective public opinion is at in uencing U.S. foreign policy and makes predictions on what this relationship will look like in the future.
CONTRIBUTOR BIO
TROY GABRIEL is a fourth year Political Science major, concentrating in Global Politics. He has participated in Cal Poly's Model United Nations club, attending conferences in New York City and San Francisco. Troy wrote this paper for a Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy class and chose this topic because of the frequency with which public opinion polls on current events are cited in the news. Finding himself curious about the e ectiveness of these polls on decision-making, Troy decided to examine case studies to understand the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy decisions in America. After Troy graduates, he plans on joining the Peace Corps, teaching English, before attending graduate school. 1 e authorized campaign calls for American airstrikes in Syria as well as the deployment of 475 military advisors to Iraq. 2 ese military advisors are being sent in order to assist the Kurdish and Iraqi forces with more training, intelligence, and equipment against these ghters.
3 President Obama made it clear that these forces will not be used in any combat capacity, but will strictly be there to support U.S. allies in the region. 4 is new authorization will bring the total number of American troops in Iraq to 1,600. 5 e President also called on Congress to authorize the allocation of resources in order to "train and equip" the opposition forces ghting the Assad regime in Syria. 6 is new authorization comes just two weeks after the President was criticized for not having a strategy to deal with the rising threat, paralleling the change in public opinion, 7 with 53% of adults approving of the plan. 8 is rapid change in the administration's position towards ISIS is not an outlier in the history of executive action, and it is important to put this most recent announcement into the context of recent history. A year to the day before the speech President Barack Obama gave regarding ISIS, he gave a speech discussing America's involvement Syria. 9 In it, Obama argued the bene ts of limited airstrikes in Syria, 10 counter to the prevailing opinion of the public of noninvolvement.
11 Just a few weeks earlier, Obama stated that he "will seek authorization for the use of force from the American people's representatives in Congress" and not use his executive authority. 12 e choice by the president to defer the decision to Congress, and not use executive action, shows that this is not the rst time Obama has entertained the public's interest in foreign policy matters. An earlier example occurred near the end of the Bush administration. In 2007, 63% of the public was in favor of their congressional representatives voting for a bill to withdraw troops from Iraq in the next year. 13 e following year, Bush announced that there would be a withdrawal of 8,000 troops by February of 2009, appearing to give in to the public's will. While Bush wielded his authority in order to appease the public, Obama left the decision up to Congress, or the people directly.
14 ese instances show that the quick policy decisions and changes made by executives occur regardless of the administration, and give context when looking at other historical examples.
e in uence that public opinion has on the executives who make contemporary U.S. foreign policy is a very important relationship study, and has profound implications for how we understand the formulation of American foreign policy. If U.S foreign policy is always guided by the prevailing public opinion, polices can be shortsighted and overlook key issues. e tendency for policies to not be as informed if guided by public opinion can be seen in a study done by Rogers, Stuhler, and Koeing in which they nd that there is a "large gap" between the opinions of knowledgeable experts and that of the general public. 15 e researchers go on to make the assertion that the foreign policy opinions of experts were "speci c, many-sided, analytical, and exible," while the general public's opinions "tended to be vague and sporadic." 16 On the other hand, if public opinion is not a part of the equation in U.S. foreign policy formulation, then is it still accurate to label the U.S. as a 12 Statement by the President on Syria. e White House, August 31, 2013. representative democracy? It seems as if public opinion has an e ect on the formulation and path of U.S. foreign policy, but it is unclear by how much of a role it plays.
is uncertainty leads me to ask the following question: How e ective is public opinion at in uencing U.S. foreign policy?
Conventional Wisdom
e democratic ideal of a responsive, representative government illustrates the prevailing belief that public opinion matters in both domestic and foreign issues.
is ideal is an essential part of American political culture, one that the public whole-heartedly believes in. For instance, in a poll conducted by World Public Opinion, 81% of respondents said that when governmental leaders are making an important decision, they "should pay attention to public opinion polls because this will help them get a sense of the public's views." 17 is nding is further backed up by the principle expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that "the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of government," with 87% of Americans agreeing.
18
In a study done by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, polling data shows that the long-range policy priorities of the general public and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) are similar in several key areas.
19
Both believe that protecting the U.S. from terrorism is a top priority, with 83% of the public and 76% of the CFR. ere is also large overlap in regard to preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with 73% of the public and 81% of the CFR making it a priority. 20 When there is large overlap between the opinions of the public and those of policy elites, it seems clear that public opinion is e ective at in uencing foreign policy. However, the idealism of democracy is not always the reality of democracy, and it would be a mistake to draw such a conclusion.
is conventional wisdom is misleading because it suggests that the general public has a direct role in which policies are top priorities, when evidence 17 suggests otherwise. Such evidence can be seen when looking at the public's opinion on the war in Iraq. At the start of the war in 2003, public support was at a high of 74%. 21 Yet just a few years later in 2007 public support for the war had dropped to 40%, with a majority of 53% of the public favoring withdrawal. 22 Even though the majority opinion favored a change in policy, the change did not happen for another 4 years, when the war o cially ended. 23 If the conventional wisdom were entirely true, the timeline of the war would have paralleled the changes in the public opinion. e fact that it didn't show that foreign policy is not always in uenced by public opinion, illustrates a aw in the conventional wisdom.
eoretical Paradigm
To best understand the research question and the case studies presented, the research is framed using the theoretical paradigm of U.S. foreign policy known as group dynamics. is theory was de ned by Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander as a " eld of inquiry dedicated to advancing knowledge about the nature of groups, the laws of their development, and their interrelations with individuals, other groups, and larger institutions." 24 In regard to U.S. foreign policy and international relations, the theory of group dynamics is predicated on the belief that special interests or elites, not the state, in uence political outcomes. 25 is general beliefs leads to the other core assumptions of the group dynamics theory. e rst of these core assumptions is that decision-making actors are susceptible to the in uence of groupthink. ese interactions in the group might "exert pressures for conformity to group norms," 27 an inherently bad thing, as it can "inhibit the search for information and policy options . . . suppressing some forms of intragroup con ict that might serve to clarify goals, values, and opinions." 28 A second core assumption of group dynamics theory is that when it comes to the group of decision-makers, "the power elite," 29 its members are from small group of "political, economic, and military men." 30 According to this assumption, this group comes from "the upper third of the income and occupational pyramids," which makes this group relatively unrepresentative of the majority. It is this assumption that is most pertinent to the research presented in this paper. 31 Group dynamics, and the assumptions stated above, is the most appropriate and tting theory to frame and explain the in uence of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy. First, group dynamics' assumption that individuals or groups, not the state, in uence political outcomes helps frame the case studies presented in this paper regarding decisions of Presidents during wartime.
is is due to the concept of groupthink, since the policy decision makers are not interacting with the public on a daily basis, and do not view the public as their peers. e people they do interact with daily, their peers, will inherently place pressures on the decision makers to appease or conform to the group thinking, potentially having "a signi cant impact on the substance and quality of decisions." 32 is theory has a negative viewpoint concerning the research question. e fact that the decision maker group is separate from the public opinion suggests that they therefore do not have an in uence on policy formulation. e second assumption made by this theory regarding the make-up of the "power elite" further highlights its usefulness when framing the answer to the research question. By assuming that the power elite are comprised of an unrepresentative minority of industry leaders, the ine ectiveness of the public opinion's in uence becomes clear. How can public opinion compete with the in uence that this small group of people have, a group who are interacting with each other every day and developing personal relationships? It is because of these assumptions that 28 Ibid. 29 Mills, e Power Elite 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Holsti, "Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy." the theory of group dynamics best frames the answer to the research question presented in this paper.
e Vietnam War e military operation in Vietnam that lasted from November 1955 until April 1975 is one of notoriety in United States history. It was a timed lled with protests and civil disobedience, as well as a period in which the leaders of the U.S. faced the challenge of balancing policy they deemed appropriate and the policy the public demanded. In retrospect, most people, public and policy elite, consider the Vietnam engagement as a mistake, one some deem an "important history lesson." 33 Yet when this was a contemporary issue, that sentiment was not as wide spread, with many of the policy elites deeming the war e ort a righteous one based on democratic principles. 34 Due to the contradictory relationship between the public and the policy elites during the Vietnam War, this period is important to consider when attempting to answer the research question.
In order to study this relationship properly, it will be important to approach this case study in a chronological fashion. By observing how the war developed over time, and the policy decisions that a ected it, the cause and e ect relationship between the public opinion and the policy decisions should become apparent. U.S. involvement in Vietnam began during the Eisenhower administration in November of 1955.
35 Initially, U.S. involvement played a strictly supportive role, not a military one. In Eisenhower's Annual Budget Message to the Congress for the Fiscal Year of 1956, he proposed to "furnish defense support to several countries" in Southeast Asia, Vietnam included. time. 37 e prevailing belief of foreign policy elites was the Domino eory, which theorizes that in order to prevent ghting at home the U.S. must engage the Communist ideal in foreign countries, lest the weaker states fall and Communism comes knocking on the U.S.'s doorstep. 38 Due to this fear of Communism, those who were informed generally accepted the assistance to a number of Southeast Asian countries that Eisenhower had proposed, but the majority of U.S. citizens were unaware of the involvement at all. 39 Due to this lack of an informed public, the public opinion of such a policy was irrelevant to the policy elites at the time, since there simply was not one. e lack of an obvious public opinion lead most policy leaders to believe that a policy of assistance to these countries was one that was supported by most.
is was seen in the next administration, when President John F. Kennedy informed the President of the Republic of Vietnam that the U.S. would promptly increase the assistance to the Vietnamese defense e ort in 1961. and increasing the U.S. ghting force to 190,000 men. 43 In the same speech, Johnson addressed the American people with a forceful statement; " e days may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle," a statement that was a prelude to the arduous future of the war. 44 It seems that this was an example in which policy elites were in uenced by the public opinion, yet this is not the case, as the belief in the support of the majority that Johnson held was an inaccurate one. An article published in e New York Times on March 27, 1966 reported, "many thousands took part in demonstrations during the day" in a number of large cities throughout the U.S. 45 In New York City, there were between 20,000 and 25,000 marchers on Fifth Avenue alone. 46 Protests were taking place in other cities around the country on that same day, likely with similar numbers. It would be a mistake to consider an active vocal group numbering in the tens of thousands as a "small minority of dissent." 47 A study done by the Gallup organization the following year found that a majority of respondents to a survey disapproved of the way that President Johnson was handling the situation in Vietnam, 48 further showing the inaccuracy in the amount of support for President Johnson. Even as evidence was presented that suggested the policy choices that the President made were not following the policy decisions the public wanted, Johnson remained steadfast on his policy choices. In his State of the Union Address in 1968, Johnson outlined how increased support for the war was needed and authorized the deployment of additional 13,500 men, only weeks after he had sent about 11,000 additional Marine and airborne troops. 49 is decision made by the President shows just how ine ective public opinion was at in uencing U.S. foreign policy during this administration. 43 Johnson, "State of the Union." (1966) . 44 Ibid. As the Nixon administration took over, many members of the public hoped that Nixon would simply end the war immediately by ordering the U.S. forces home. 50 Yet Nixon did not do this, stating, "I would have betrayed my solemn responsibility as President of the United States if I had done so." 51 is is an extremely telling quote, as it gives insight into the mindset of foreign policy elites. According to Nixon, adhering to the whims of the public opinion, concerning foreign policy, is a terrible thing for the country as a whole.
is is counter to the prevailing popular belief in Democratic eory, in which the public should be an important actor in governmental decision-making. 52 If policy elites share this belief, it might explain why public opinion is ine ective in in uence U.S. foreign policy.
By 1971, it was common knowledge among the public and policy elites that polling data showed an overwhelming majority of Americans wanted the troops out of Vietnam by the end of the year, with a staggering 75% of people reputing the President's policy. 53 Even with such a large majority of the American public calling for an end to the war in Vietnam, it persisted through the rest of the Nixon administration and into the Ford administration. U.S. involvement in Vietnam did not end until President Gerald Ford announced on April 29, 1975 that "the military situation in the area [Saigon] deteriorated rapidly… I therefore ordered the evacuation of all American personnel remaining in South Vietnam." 54 e public had nally achieved what they wanted, after voicing their opinion for over a decade. It is clear that during the Vietnam War public opinion was at best commentary about the war, with little in uence over foreign policy formulation. Instead, the policies made by policy elites during the war were the policies they deemed most appropriate, regardless of the public opinion. President Nixon stated this in a response to a letter he received from a university student, "the policies we are now following re ect our own best judgment, 50 Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation on Vietnam," May 14, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, e American Presidency Project. 51 Ibid. based on exhaustive study of all the available evidence, of how to achieve that goal. To abandon that policy merely because of a public demonstration would therefore be an act of gross irresponsibility on my part." 55 is sentiment would persist through many administrations, guiding executives like George W. Bush to continually disregard the majority public opinion in favor of the policy elite throughout his involvement in the Iraq War.
e Iraq War e Iraq War is another important case study to examine as it shares many similarities with the Vietnam War, such as a supportive public in the beginning with a quick shift to public dissatisfaction as the war wore on. Meanwhile, policy elites and administration o cials remained steadfast in their commitment to see the war through, claiming the ghting was for democratic principles just as their predecessors did forty years before. 56 A key di erence, however, between the two con icts is the fact the onset of the Iraq War was brought on by the terrorist attacks carried out on September 11, 2001 against the United States, while there was no attack on U.S. soil before the Vietnam War. 57 Another key di erence is that the Vietnam War spanned across four di erent administrations, while the Iraq War only spanned two. It is important to shed light on these di erences as they have implications on the mood of the public opinion, and therefore are an important aspect of this research. In order to understand the relationship shared between U.S. foreign policy and the public opinion it will again be important to continue through this case study chronologically. Again, this will help to illustrate the cause and e ect relationship between public opinion and foreign policy decisions.
As stated before, the catalyst of the Iraq War was the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City. It was originally believed that Iraq and the Hussein regime 78 had supported al-Qaeda to some capacity in carrying out the attack, 58 and that it was working to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). 59 Due to the passage of the "Joint Resolution to Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against ose Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United States," the president had the authority to "take military action against any nation, organization, or persons that had been involved in the 9/11 attacks." 60 e Bush administration was determined to include Iraq in this group, and in his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush began his campaign to do this. In his speech he labeled Iraq as a member of a new "axis of evil" consisting of states aimed at threatening the peace of the world. 61 63 and by May of that same year, President Bush announced that, "major combat operations in Iraq have ended" from the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln. 64 So what was going through the minds of the American public throughout this period of quick, policy decisions? Well, in general, most of the public was supportive of the policy, with Bush's approval rating reaching a peak of 76% after the fall of Baghdad. 65 It was easy for the public to support such a foreign policy since the war e ort was to prevent Iraq from acquiring WMDs, further the growing "global war on terrorism," 66 and promote democracy. 67 is might suggest a causal relationship between the public opinion and the policy decisions made, however causality is not present.
e policies made by the Bush administration at the onset of the Iraq War were not in response to public polling data, but rather policies the administration wanted to pursue. 68 Paul Wolfowitz, the United States Deputy Secretary during the rst term of the Bush administration, stated, "We settled on [WMDs as the core reason to go to war because] everyone could agree."
69 It was not as though the public believed Iraq had WMDs and then pressured their elected o cials to pursue a more aggressive policy, but rather the elected o cials framing their policy so "everyone could agree." 70 However, this massive support would not last, and as of 2004, Bush's approval rating began a slow, consistent, decline. 71 At the beginning of 2004, public opinion for the Iraq War was positive, with between 54% and 58% saying that the war was not a mistake. 72 Five months later, after the announcement that the U.S. would transfer sovereignty back to Iraq, polling data found that the percent of Americans in support of the war had fallen to 46%. 73 A large majority of the public believed that the transfer of power was a sign that U.S. policy was failing because the transfer occurred before the U.S. could bring about stability in the country. 74 When asked how long they thought the U.S. should have a signi cant number of troops in Iraq, 80 the study found that a majority said less than a year. 75 By the end of the year, a majority of people disapproved of the United States' decision to go to war with Iraq. 76 e quick decline in public approval for the Iraq war is likely due to the lack of any evidence suggesting Iraq had WMDs and revelations made by the 9/11 Commission. In October of 2003, David Kay, the head of the group responsible for locating WMDs in Iraq, gave a preliminary report to Congress in which he stated that his inspection team had failed to nd any WMDs in the country. 77 e summer of the next year, the 9/11 Commission found that there was "no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda had cooperated on attacks against the U.S." 78 ese ndings showed that the Bush administration was incorrect when they began to formulate the Iraq policy that would de ne the decade.
ese blunders of the administration are likely what led to the quick change in public opinion.
By 2005, the growing public opinion was that the war in Iraq was going badly for the United States. 79 Regardless, the Bush administration pushed on with their Iraq policy. In an interview on CNN, then Vice President Dick Cheney stated, "we'll leave as soon as the task is over with." 80 President Bush continued in this rhetoric when he said, "we're not leaving, so long as I'm the President." 81 e true e ect or lack thereof, that public opinion had on foreign policy during the Iraq War is evident when listening to Bush's own words regarding the matter, "I don't think you've ever heard me say, 'Gosh, I'd better change position because the polls say this or that'… I'm going to do what I think is right, and if people don't like me for it, that's just the way it is." 82 is idea became practice when Bush committed an additional 20,000 American troops and an additional carrier strike group to Iraq, 83 even as polling data showed that 60% of Americans believed that originally sending troops to Iraq was a mistake, 84 and a majority believed that U.S. troops should be withdrawn from Iraq within a year. 85 It was not until the end of 2008 that Bush nally announced a decrease in the U.S. military presence, when he stated, "Iraqi forces will now take the lead in security operations in Anbar, with American troops moving into an over-watch role." 86 De-escalation of U.S. military involvement in Iraq began when President Barack Obama took o ce in 2009. In a speech given at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, the President announced that the U.S. combat mission would end by August 31, 2010, leaving only transitional forces to be removed by the end of 2011. 87 e war was nally over on December 15, 2011 when the President announced that the troops were preparing to make their nal march out of the country. 88 e Iraq War is evidence of the ine ectiveness that public opinion truly has on U.S. foreign policy. For half of Bush's Presidency, the policy decisions he was making were the policy choices that the majority public opinion didn't want. Perhaps because of this, "nearly two-thirds say his administration will be remembered more for its failures than its accomplishments."
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Implications
e ine ectiveness that public opinion has on U.S. foreign policy is telling of the future of how the U.S. public, and the world, views U.S. foreign policy. As other states make gains in catching up to the United States in terms of public opinion does not count or matter. As the decision makers of foreign policy become more concentrated in the "power elite," the foreign policy decisions will become less representative of the public. is will cause the future of U.S. foreign policy to resemble an oligarchy rather than a democracy, potentially a hindrance to the United States' ability to spread democratic ideals overseas. It is clear from the research presented that public opinion is not at all e ective at in uencing U.S. foreign policy.
